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Résumé / Abstract 
 
Dans le cadre du modèle d’enchères à valeurs privées et indépendantes, nous dérivons les 
implications empiriques du comportement d'équilibre dans les enchères à enveloppe scellée au  
premier prix, lorsque les incréments sont discrets. Bien que les comportements d'équilibre 
diffèrent lorsque les mises prennent des valeurs discrètes plutôt que continues, ces différences 
disparaissent typiquement comme les incréments tendent vers zéro. En pratique, les mises 
dans les enchères prennent des valeurs discrètes.  De plus, ceci peut simplifier les calculs 
nécessaires pour estimer et tester les modèles d'enchères. Notre approche s’insère dans le 
cadre d’un modèle d'inférence incomplet et nous permet de tester si les données sont 
cohérentes avec un comportement d'équilibre dans le cadre d’un modèle symétrique aussi bien 
qu'asymétrique. Nous démontrons l'utilité de l'approche en l’appliquant à des données 
générées à partir d’expériences en laboratoire.  
 




Within the independent private-values paradigm, we derive the equilibrium implications 
of purposeful bidding behaviour at single-unit, first-price, sealed-bid auctions when discrete 
increments are imposed on bidding. While equilibrium purposeful behaviour with discrete bid 
increments is different from that which would obtain were continuous variation in bids 
permitted, these differences typically disappear as the bid increments go to zero. But discrete 
bid increments are a common feature at many real-world auctions. Moreover, their presence 
can simplify computation when estimating and testing auction models. Our approach fits 
within a model of incomplete inference and allows us to test sequentially for symmetric, 
equilibrium purposeful behaviour as well as asymmetric, equilibrium purposeful behaviour. 
We demonstrate the utility of the approach by applying it to data from laboratory 
experiments. 
 
Keywords: inference in auctions, discrete bidding, asymmetric auctions. 
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 1. Introduction
During the last four decades, economists have made considerable progress in under-
standing the theoretical structure of strategic behaviour under market mechanisms,
such as auctions, when a small number of potential participants exists; see Krishna
(2002) for a comprehensive book-length survey of progress. During the last ¯fteen
years, two distinct empirical strategies designed to take these theoretical models to ei-
ther experimental or ¯eld data have been proposed; see Hendricks and Paarsch (1995)
for a review.
One analytic device, commonly used to describe bidder motivation at auctions,
is a continuous random variable which represents individual-speci¯c heterogeneity
in valuations. The conceptual experiment involves each potential bidder's receiving
an independent draw from a distribution of valuations. Conditional on this random
variable, the economic actors are assumed to act purposefully, maximizing either
expected pro¯t or the expected utility of pro¯t from winning the auction. An
assumption then made for computational parsimony is that agents choose their bids
continuously when maximizing their expected objective function. Of course, this
seemingly innocuous and certainly natural assumption is made so that the calculus
can be used to characterize optimal behaviour. Another frequently-made assumption
is that agents are ex ante symmetric, their independent draws coming from the same
distribution of valuations, an assumption that then allows one to aggregate across all
potential economic actors and to focus on one \representative" ¯rst-order condition
when describing optimal behaviour. Finally, researchers typically impose a notion of
equilibrium, such as Bayes-Nash, to close the model.
At many real-world auctions, economic agents are required to submit bids in
discrete increments. In such cases, equilibrium purposeful behaviour is di®erent from
that which would obtain in a continuous-variation model. Also, in many economic
environments, asymmetries in valuations across bidders of di®erent types are often
important, making the assumption of symmetry untenable. Finally, a notion of
equilibrium is often used to identify the data-generating process (DGP) of the model
(in the Hood-Koopmans econometric sense), so it is then impossible to test such a
notion without recourse to additional assumptions; e.g., a functional-form assumption
concerning the distribution from which the valuations are drawn.
While each of the three maintained assumptions described above is made for com-
putational parsimony and tractability, it is of considerable interest to have a strategy
to decide whether individually and together they are, in fact, an accurate character-
ization of the phenomena they are used to model. This turns out to be extremely
di±cult to carry out computationally in the continuous-variation model, except for
very simple examples. In this paper, we hope to make some progress on this problem
by relaxing the assumption of continuous choice, assuming instead that potential par-
ticipants at auctions are constrained to bid in ¯xed and known discrete increments.
1By focussing on observed market behaviour, speci¯cally non-participation as well as
the bids tendered at single-unit, ¯rst-price, sealed-bid auction, we then characterize
the conditions under which the observed actions of potential bidders are consistent
with the notion of symmetric, Bayes-Nash equilibrium behaviour. We then go on
to specify conditions su±cient to test for just Bayes-Nash equilibrium behaviour,
relaxing the symmetry assumption. Finally, we admit the presence of di®erential
risk aversion among potential bidders. We demonstrate the utility of our proposed
approach by applying it to data from laboratory experiments.
Ours is a model of incomplete inference studied ¯rst in the econometrics literature
by Horowitz and Manski (1995) and then used to interpret ¯eld data concerning oral,
ascending-price (English) auctions by Haile and Tamer (2003). Haile and Tamer
(2003) concerned themselves with the \continuous button" model of an English
auction, noting that observed data from real-world oral, ascending-price auctions
often occur in jumps, do not vary continously. Our concept of equilibrium, Bayes-
Nash, is di®erent from that of Haile and Tamer (2003) who used the concept of
dominance. Moreover, whereas Haile and Tamer (2003) provide no test of equilibrium
purposeful behaviour, but rather use the theory as an identifying assumption, we
provide explicit tests against di®erent alternatives which may be non-nested. Like
Haile and Tamer (2003), we note that the discrete nature of bidding prevents the
econometrician from recovering an estimate of the \exact" distribution of latent
heterogeneity. And, as in Haile and Tamer (2003), we note that this lack of precision
changes the nature of the optimal mechanism-design problem.
Our research is distinct from that of Athey and Haile (2002) who considered the
identi¯cation of standard (continous-variation) models of auctions under alternative
data sampling schemes, but the work is complementary to that of Guerre, Perrigne,
and Vuong (2000) as well as Campo, Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) who
investigated non-parametric identi¯cation, estimation, and testing in continuous-
variation, symmetric, ¯rst-price, sealed-bid auction models within the independent
private-values paradigm (IPVP), without and with risk aversion.
2. Motivating Empirical Example
Consider an empirical worker who has collected a sample of data concerning a se-
quence of T ¯rst-price, sealed-bid auctions at which single, identical objects are sold
independently to n potential buyers. The rules of the auction require that bidders
submit sealed tenders from a countable, ¯nite set of discrete bids. The empirical
worker summarizes these bidding data into counts where mi denotes the number of
times a bid ki was observed where i =;1;:::;K; m0 denotes the number of times that
a bidder declined to participate, did not bid. Note that m0 equals (nT ¡
PK
i=1 mi).
The vector m, which equals (m0;m1;:::;mK), collects these.
Now, under the assumption of independence and for some true model, the









where the probability of bid ki under the true model is denoted ¼0
i and where the
vector ¼0 collects the ¼0
i s, equalling (¼0
0;¼0
1;:::;¼0
K). Given ¼0, calculating the prob-
ability that the observed data m came from (2.1) is straightforward. We are interested
in deciding whether the true model is \Bayes-Nash consistent" (BNC). Our use of
BNC is closest to the use of \rationalizable" by Campo, Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong
(2000). The term BNC is di®erent from other ways in which the term \rationaliz-
able" has been used in economics, particularly by theorists; see, for example, Dekel
and Wolinsky (2001), Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002), and Cho (2002). To appre-
ciate our usage of BNC, we turn next to the speci¯cation of a theoretical model in
which the term has content.
3. Theoretical Model
We consider a theoretical model in which n potential bidders vie for the right to buy a
single object at a ¯rst-price, sealed-bid auction. At this auction, agents must submit
bids in discrete increments. Let K, equal fk0;k1;k2;:::;kK;kK+1g, denote the set of
possible bids submitted. Here ki+1 equals (ki + ¢i) for positive increments ¢i and
all i = 1;:::;K. We denote the lowest admissible bid, the reserve price, by k1 and
the highest observed bid, but not necessarily the highest admissible one, by kK. In
principle, a bidder could submit kK+1 which equals (kK +¢K). For non-participants,
we denote the null bid by k0 which, without loss of generality, we normalize to be
zero. When the increments are the same, we suppress the subscript and just refer to
the increment as ¢. In the event of ties, the object is allocated at random to one of
the tied bidders. Speci¯cally, if ` bidders each submit the same highest bid kj, then
one is chosen at random to be the winner with probability (1=`).
Within our model, potential bidders have valuations that are assumed initially to
be independently and identically distributed draws of a continuous random variable
V having cumulative distribution function F(v), probability density function f(v),
and support on the interval [v; ¹ v]; i.e., we work within the IPVP.
Our theoretical model is developed in terms of observables; viz., the number
of potential bidders n as well as the distributions of non-participation and observed
bids. To this end, we denote the probability of observing bid ki by ¼i; ¼0 denotes
the probability of not participating at the auction. We collect the ¼is in the vector
¼ which equals (¼0;¼1;:::;¼K); ¼ denotes the probability distribution over K where PK
i=0 ¼i equals one. We assume that, like n and F(v), ¼ is common knowledge to
the potential bidders. We introduce ¦i, the cumulative distribution function, which
3equals
Pi
j=0 ¼j, the probability that a bidder bids ki or less, and collect all of these
in the vector ¦ which equals (¼0;¦1;:::;¦K¡1;1).
We assume that a representative potential bidder of type v seeks to maximize




For a representative bidder, we denote by ¡i the equilibrium probability of winning
if ki is submitted; these probabilities are collected in ¡ equal (¡0;¡1;:::;¡K;¡K+1).
Using ¼, we seek to calculate the elements of the vector ¡. We know some of the
¡is already. For example, if some one does not participate at the auction, then the
probability of his winning is zero, so ¡0 equals zero. Also, if some one bids more than
the observed maximum, then he is sure to win, so ¡K+1 equals one. For the remaining
¡is, one can verify directly that the following constitutes a symmetric, Bayes-Nash




8 i = 1;2;:::;K: (3.1)
The numerator of (3.1) is the probability that the highest bid is exactly equal to ki,
while the denominator is the expected number of potential bidders submitting bid ki.
We now consider a representative bidder's best response when confronted by ¡.
For valuation v, it is optimal to bid ki when the following inequalities hold:
(v ¡ ki)¡i ¸ (v ¡ kj)¡j 8 j 6= i: (3.2)
In words, the expected pro¯t from bid ki weakly exceeds that for any alternative
bid kj. Of course, this is just the de¯nition of ki's being optimal. Obviously, this
set of inequalities is the discrete analogue to the equilibrium ¯rst-order condition for
expected-pro¯t maximization in the continuous-variation model which takes the form








When the reserve price is r, (3.3) has the following convenient solution:




which, except perhaps for the integral in the numerator of the right-most term on the
right-hand side of (3.4), is much more compact to deal with computationally than
the set of inequalities presented by (3.2).
44. Bayes-Nash Consistent Behaviour
Given the expected-pro¯t maximizing, Bayes-Nash equilibrium behaviour character-
ized in the previous section, what restrictions does this behaviour impose on the
DGP? We introduce the notion of BNC behaviour, a term whose usage is similar
to the way in which Campo et al. (2000) use the term \rationalizable" within the
continuous-variation model. Since our theoretical framework is slightly di®erent from
Campo et al., we state separately our de¯nition below.
De¯nition 1: A vector ¼ over K is Bayes-Nash consistent if there exists a
(Bayes-Nash) equilibrium that generates ¼ as an equilibrium distribution of bids.
Theorem 1: A vector ¼ over K is Bayes-Nash consistent, if and only if, for all






8 1 · t < i < s · K + 1 (4.1)


















When the conditions of Theorem 4.1 hold, vi is less than or equal to ¹ vi for all i
such that ¼i is strictly positive. All types v that are greater than or equal to vi
will prefer to bid ki rather than any lower price; all types v that are less than
or equal to ¹ vi will prefer to bid ki rather than any higher price. It follows that,
for all v 2 [vi; ¹ vi], it is optimal to bid ki. We need to assign a probability that
v lies in [vi; ¹ vi], equal ¼i. If vi equals ¹ vi, then we assume a mass point at ¹ vi in
the distribution of valuations. The corresponding F(¢) is constructed so that the
observed distribution of bids is consistent with the strategy of the bidder and
the distribution of types. Each participant bids optimally, given the distribution
of others' bids. Now, when the conditions of Theorem 4.1 fail to hold and vi
5exceeds ¹ vi, then no v exists for which it is optimal to bid ki. Hence, we must
have ¼i equal to zero.
Verifying that the vector of sample bid proportions ^ p, which equals (m=T=n), is
BNC simply involves verifying that the ^ ¡is, the estimated ¡is which are calculated
using ^ p in place of ¼ according to equation (3.1), satisfy the inequalities in (4.1) of
Theorem 1. This step is equivalent to verifying that the estimated »(v) function,
in the notation of Guerre et al. (2000), is a monotonically increasing function of the
valuation v. In our model, this step requires less computational e®ort because the bids
come in discrete increments, which happen to be a reality in many problems.1 Note
that when ^ p is BNC, one strategy for estimating the p-value, at least asymptotically






where ^ p¡0 is ^ p without ^ p0 and
§(^ p¡0) =
0
B B B B B
@
^ p1(1 ¡ ^ p1) ¡^ p1^ p2 ::: ¡^ p1^ pK
¡^ p1^ p2 ^ p2(1 ¡ ^ p2) ::: ¡^ p2^ pK
. . .
. . . ... . . .
¡^ p1¼K ¡^ p2^ pK ::: ^ pK(1 ¡ ^ pK)
1
C C C C C
A
(4.2)
and then keeping track of the proportion of rejections according to (4.1) when s,
which is s¡0 augmented by s0 which equals (1 ¡
PK
i=1 si) is used instead of ¼.
Note that ¼ lives in the simplex SK. In that simplex, we denote the set of all
points that are BNC by C (for \consistent") which is a subset of SK. Of course, the
reader might ask: Can C be empty? No. A uniform distribution on ¼, the point in
the middle of SK which equals ([1=(K +1)];[1=(K +1)];:::;[1=(K +1)]), will always
be BNC. For a given distribution F(v) and under the sort of equilibrium purposeful
behaviour assumed in section 3, the \true" model ¼0 will live in C. Note too that
other candidate ¼s can also live in C.
When ^ p strays out of C, two reasons can exist: ¯rst, sampling error or, second,
agents are not behaving according to theory, for whatever cause. We need to assess
the relative importance of these two explanations and then provide a strategy to
disentangle the potential reasons why agents are not behaving according to the theory.
Obviously, without additional information, we cannot ascertain what the unknown
¼0 is; we can only try to estimate it.
1 Using the Guerre et al. (2000) approach, one would ¯rst ¯nd the optimal bandwith, next
kernel-smooth the bid distribution, then construct an estimate of »(v), and ¯nally check to see
that ^ »(v), the estimate of »(v), is monotonically increasing in v.
6Now, the statistical sampling theory for the multinomial distribution is extremely
well developed, so we can deal with sampling variation in a straightforward manner,
provided we can calculate the probability of observing a ^ p not contained in C, given
a ¼ contained in C.
To this end, we seek some of C's properties. First, the set C is quite large,
relatively speaking. For example, when K is small, one can derive, by brute-force
calculation, a set of inequalities that characterizes C. If n is two and K is three, then
the following de¯nes C:





in the simplex S3. (The reader should note that when n is two and K is two, the
set C equals the simplex S2. This obtains because any behaviour can be rationalized
at either of the endpoints and, with a K of two, basically, only endpoints exist so
no other constraints on the process exist.) In dimensions for K that are higher than
three, characterizing C is computationally arduous. Also, trying to bound C is di±cult
because the set can be non-convex.2 Thus, the approximation error associated with
any bounding strategy is potentially quite large. What to do?
5. Testing BNC Behaviour
From a computational perspective, characterizing C is extremely di±cult. But we
need C because, when ^ p is not BNC, we want to estimate the probability of getting
^ p, given the \nearest" BNC point. This forms the basis of our testing procedure.
Now, the problems of characterizing C and ¯nding a point in C closest to ^ p are
obviously related. However, because these are conceptually distinct problems, we
break up discussing them, examining each in series.
5.1. Distance from ^ p to C
How does one calculate distance in SK to de¯ne the nearest point? One possibility is
just the Euclidean distance k^ p ¡ ¼k2. Estimating this distance involves solving the
following constrained optimization problem:
min
<¼>
k^ p ¡ ¼k2 subject to ¼ 2 C ½ SK:
2 To see this, impose equality in (4.3) and write ¼1 as a function of ¼2 and ¼3. Straightforward
di®erentiation reveals that the derivatives can change sign, when either ¼2 (or ¼3) are held
constant while ¼3 (or ¼2) are varied, implying that the set is non-convex.
7Now, the variance of ^ pi depends on the relative value of ¼i. To adjust for this, one
might use a second possibility; viz., minimizing the Mahalanobis norm (see Rao 1973,
p. 542), which involves solving the following constrained optimization problem:
min
<¼¡0> (^ p¡0 ¡ ¼¡0)>[§(¼¡0)]¡1(^ p¡0 ¡ ¼¡0) subject to ¼ 2 C ½ SK
where §(¼¡0) is de¯ned in (4.2). We propose a third alternative, seeking instead to
maximize the empirical likelihood of having observed m subject to ¼'s being in C:
max
<¼> g(¼jm) subject to ¼ 2 C ½ SK






mi log(¼i) subject to ¼ 2 C ½ SK: (5.1)
We chose this objective function because we want to use the likelihood-ratio test to
decide whether ^ p is \signi¯cantly" di®erent from a BNC outcome and because (5.1)
is related to the Kullback-Leibler distance. We hope to exploit this relationship and
to integrate our model-testing work with that of Vuong (1989).




linearly, by multiplying it by (1=nT) and then subtracting
PK


































is the Kullback-Leibler distance, so maximizing (5.2) is equivalent to minimizing
(5.3).3










subject to ¼ 2 C ½ SK:
85.2. An Alternative Representation of C
Under any of the above distance alternatives, even if characterizing C could be done
quickly, the fact that C is typically non-convex makes the above constrained opti-
mization problem di±cult to solve accurately. In an e®ort to reduce computational
problems, we adopt an heuristic made popular by Murtagh and Saunders (1983).
In particular, we seek a transformation of the above problem in which the di±cul-
ties in characterizing C are embedded in the objective function, leaving the newly-
transformed, contrained-optimization problem with a choice set that is \easy" to deal
with computationally, in our case, convex. Of course, such a transformation can often
take a well-behaved objective function (as the logarithm of the likelihood function is
in the multinomial case, being a strictly concave function of the relevant ¼s) and in-
troduce local optima. This complication can potentially a®ect the size of our testing
procedure, but we shall discuss this later. Below, we describe the reasoning behind
the particular transformation we use as well as the speci¯cs of implementing it.
Since V is a continuous random variable, we know that an interval will exist in
which it will be optimal to bid ki. Because bids are monotonic, the interval, which
can be empty, is connected.4 When ¼i is strictly positive, we know that the interval
of \type"s for which the best response is to bid ki must be non-empty, otherwise
one could not justify the bid ki having obtained with positive probability in the ¯rst
place.
For a representative bidder, let vi denote the type which is indi®erent between
bidding ki and ki+1. We de¯ne v0 to be that bidder type who is indi®erent between
not participating and bidding the reserve price at the auction. Hence v0 equals k1,
the reserve price. We introduce V(K) as the set of all vectors v equal (v0;v1;:::;vK)
which satisfy the following constraints:
k1 = v0
ki+1 · vi i = 1;:::;K
v0 · v1 · v2 · ::: · vK
vK · ¹ v:
For a given K one can see, by direct inspection, that the set V(K) is compact and
convex. Moreover, any v 2 V(K) gives rise to a unique ¼ 2 C.
5.3. Mechanics of Computation
We start by assuming no complications, which are typically introduced by the presence
of ¼is that equal zero, and then introduce additional elements of numerical subtlety.
4 We assert this without proof; a proof will be supplied later.
9For a candidate ~ v 2 V(K), one can calculate the ~ ¡ consistent with ~ v as follows: ¯rst,
consider the equal-expected-proft condition between adjacent pairs of ki and ki+1
which must hold if ~ vi is to be an indi®erence point. Thus,
(~ vi ¡ ki)~ ¡i = (~ vi ¡ ki+1)~ ¡i+1 i = K;K ¡ 1;:::;1;
so
~ ¡i =
(~ vi ¡ ki+1)
(~ vi ¡ ki)
~ ¡i+1 i = K;K ¡ 1;:::;1
where ~ ¡K+1 equals one and ~ ¡0 equals zero. In general, however, one must also
entertain the possibility of alternative bids above ki+1 being optimal, so
~ ¡i = max
j>i
"
(~ vi ¡ kj)




Now, for a symmetric game, ~ ¼ is de¯ned implicitly by
~ ¡i =
(~ ¦i)n ¡ (~ ¦i¡1)n
n(~ ¦i ¡ ~ ¦i¡1)
8 i = K;K ¡ 1;:::;1:
But ¦K equals one while the above expression is strictly monotonic in ~ ¦i¡1 for all
~ ¦i¡1 between zero and ~ ¦i when ~ ¦i is strictly positive. Hence, for all ~ ¡i such that
(~ ¦i)n
n
< ~ ¡i < (~ ¦i)n¡1;
a unique ~ ¦i¡1 exists and is contained in [0; ~ ¦i] which equals [0; ~ ¦i¡1 + ~ ¼i] where ~ ¼i
is non-negative. Obviously, once one has ~ ¦ calculating ~ ¼ is trivial.






^ pi log[¼i(v)=^ pi] subject to
0
B B B




















B B B B B B B
B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B
@
¡1 0 0 0 ::: 0 0
1 0 0 0 ::: 0 0
0 1 0 0 ::: 0 0




. . . ... . . .
. . .
0 0 0 0 ::: 0 1
¡1 1 0 0 ::: 0 0
0 ¡1 1 0 ::: 0 0




. . . ... . . .
. . .
0 0 0 0 ::: ¡1 1
0 0 0 0 ::: 0 ¡1
1
C C C C C C C












where a candidate ~ v induces a candidate ~ ¼ which we denote implicitly by
log ~ ¼ = h(~ v):
Thus, we summarize the mathematical programme in the following notation:
min
<v> c>h(v) subject to b · Av · u and v 2 [v; ¹ v]K+1: (5.4)
Note that the sparse nature of the constraint matrix A makes this problem partic-
ularly amenable to solution using the methods of Murtagh and Saunders (1978). In
fact, in applications, we use the programme SNOPT to solve this problem numeri-
cally; see Gill, Murray and Saunders (1997).5 SNOPT uses a sequential quadratic
programming algorithm that obtains search directions from a sequence of quadratic
programming subproblems. Each quadratic-programme subproblem is solved by min-
imizing a quadratic form of a certain Lagrangian function subject to linear constraints.
An augmented Lagrangian merit function is reduced along each search direction to
ensure convergence from any starting point. SNOPT is most e±cient when only some
5 One could also use MINOS as documented by Murtagh and Saunders (1983). We chose SNOPT
because it was available while MINOS was not.
11of the variables enter nonlinearly, which is not our case as all do, or when the number
of active constraints (including simple bounds) is nearly as large as the number of
variables, which is our case.
Of course, not all candidate ~ vs are consistent with ~ ¼'s being strictly positive for
all elements. This will manifest itself by some






When (5.5) obtains, we know that ~ ¼i must be zero, so we set ~ ¡i to (~ ¦i)n¡1 and ~ ¦i¡1
to ~ ¦i. When (5.6) obtains, we set ~ ¡i to [(~ ¦i)n=n] and ~ ¦i¡1 to zero, so ~ ¼i equals ~ ¦i.
Note that in this case all ~ ¼js are zero for j less than i.
One ¯nal check must be completed in order to complete our procedure. Let `
equal the index i for which ~ ¼i is currently being solved. Denote by k` the lowest price
submitted in the proposed equilibrium. Using only the ~ ¦is calculated thus far, verify
that
(~ v`+1 ¡ k`+1)
(~ ¦`+1)n ¡ (~ ¦`)n
n(~ ¦`+1 ¡ ~ ¦`)




If this is true, then one is done; otherwise one must ¯nd the smallest j which exceeds
(i + 1) such that
(~ vj ¡ kj)
(~ ¦j)n ¡ (~ ¦j¡1)n
n(~ ¦j ¡ ~ ¦j¡1)
¸ max
"
(~ vj ¡ k`)
(~ ¦`)n¡1
n
;(~ vj ¡ k`+1)(~ ¦j¡1)n¡1
#
:
Under these conditions, ~ ¼i is zero for all i 2 f`+1;:::;j¡1g and ~ ¼` equals (~ ¦j ¡~ ¼j)
which is, of course, ~ ¦j¡1.
5.4. Advice concerning Starting Values
If ^ p is strictly positive for all elements, then whenever a candidate ~ ¼i equals zero the
Kullback-Leibler distance becomes unbounded, which is a numerical complication.
All of the special cases described above are devoted to dealing with such occasions
and may seem like a lot of work. Certainly, these cases are tedious to code. However,
a good constrained hill-climbing algorithm, like the one coded in SNOPT, can often
avoid suboptimal candidates that yield inadmissible ~ ¼s, provided \good" starting
values are used as inputs. How can one provide \good" starting values? One strategy
is to ¯nd the centre of the simplex SK, which we know is BNC, and then to calculate
the _ v consistent with it. Use this _ v as the starting point for the numerical search.
12To calculate the _ v consistent with _ ¼ equal ([1=(K +1)];:::;[1=(K +1)]) or a _ ¦
of ([1=(K + 1)];[2=(K + 1)];:::;1), do the following: ¯rst, calculate
_ ¡i =
( _ ¦i)n ¡ ( _ ¦i¡1)n
n( _ ¦i ¡ _ ¦i¡1)
i = K;K ¡ 1;:::;1;
and then solve
_ vi =
ki+1 _ ¡i+1 ¡ ki _ ¡i
_ ¡i
i = K;K ¡ 1;:::;1;
with _ v0 being k1.
5.5. Test Statistic
Given what has come before, performing a test of BNC behaviour is somewhat anti-
climactic, at least computationally. Once one has the unconstrained logarithm of the
likelihood function L(^ p) as well as the largest constrained logarithm of the likelihood
function L(~ ¼¤) where ~ ¼¤ 2 C, we propose using the likelihood-ratio test statistic
2[L(^ p) ¡ L(~ ¼¤)]
d ! Â2(K): (5.7)
to decide whether the constraint binds in a \signi¯cant" way. Here we introduce
the shorthand notation that ~ ¼¤ equals ¼(~ v¤) where ~ v¤ solves (5.4). Obviously, the
p-values for a Â2(K) can be found easily in a statistics textbook.
5.6. Practical Considerations
At least two practical considerations may make implementing the test statistic in (5.7)
impossible. First, some of the ^ pis may well equal zero, which then makes calculating
the Kullback-Leibler distance impossible; one cannot calculate the likelihood-ratio
test statistic either. What to do?
In such cases, one might want to use the Euclidean (or Mahalanobis) distance
to ¯nd · ¼, the closest point in C. Given this point, one could then use a test statistic
like
(^ p¡0 ¡ · ¼¡0)>[§(· ¼¡0)]¡1(^ p¡0 ¡ · ¼¡0) (5.8)
where §(· ¼¡0) denotes (4.2) evaluated at · ¼ which equals ¼(· v). Here · v solves (5.4)
with either the Euclidean or the Mahalanobis distance replacing the Kullback-Leibler
distance. Under the null hypothesis of BNC behaviour, this statistic is also distributed
asymptotically Â2(K).6
6 Of course, this strategy does not help if one of the elements of · ¼ is exactly equal to zero, since
then the inverse of the matrix §(· ¼¡0) will not exist. In practice, we have as yet to encounter
such an outcome.
13Second, the transformation used to create the compact and convex set V(K) may
introduce local optima in the objective function, regardless of which distance one uses,
be it Euclidean, Mahalanobis, or Kulback-Leibler. One commonly-suggested way to
check for the presence of these local optima is to try di®erent starting values and then
to check to see what happens to the solution. Obviously, this strategy can provide
evidence of multiple local optima, but the absence of such evidence clearly does not
guarantee that a particular optimum is the global one.
The possibility of local optima is troublesome. For it implies that the likelihood-
ratio test [or any other test based on a distance, such as the Wald-type test proposed
above (5.8)] will be inconsistent. To wit, its actual size will be less than its nominal
size: the test will tend to under-reject the null hypothesis. The reader should note
that this is not a property of our transformation of the problem to the v space: it
would exist in the original speci¯cation too.
6. Incomplete Inference concerning F(v)
One way to view auction theory is as a speci¯c application of the theory of optimal
mechanism design. Over the past four decades, economists have made considerable
progress in understanding factors in°uencing prices realized from goods sold at auc-
tion. For example, they have found that the seller's expected revenue depends on
the type of auction employed, the rules that govern bidding, the number of potential
bidders, the information available to potential bidders, and the attitudes of bidders
toward risk. From a policy-maker's perspective, however, one of the most important
problems involves choosing the selling mechanism that obtains the most pro¯t for
the seller. To a large extent, the structure of the optimal selling mechanism depends
on the informational environment. Within the IPVP, which was ¯rst developed by
Vickrey (1961), it is known that, under risk neutrality, four quite di®erent auction
formats | the oral, ascending-price (English); the ¯rst-price, sealed-bid; the second-
price, sealed-bid (Vickrey); and the oral, descending-price (Dutch) auctions | garner
the same expected revenue for the seller. This result, which is known as the \Revenue
Equivalence Proposition" (REP), is of considerable interest to both economists and
policy makers. Given the REP, one question that arises naturally is can one still
improve on the structure of the four auction formats? Within a continuous-variation
model, Riley and Samuelson (1981) have shown that devising a selling mechanism
which maximizes the seller's expected gain involves choosing an optimal reserve price
½¤. Speci¯cally, ½¤ should be determined according to the following equation:




where vS is the seller's valuation for the object for sale.
14The literature concerned with mechanism design has often been criticized as
lacking practical value because the optimal selling mechanism depends on random
variables whose distributions are typically unknown to the designer. In the past,
because the distributions of valuations have been unknown, calculating the optimal
reserve price, the optimal selling mechanism, for a real-world auction was impossible.
At auctions within the IPVP and with continuous-variation, the equilibrium bidding
strategies of potential bidders are increasing functions of their valuations. For exam-
ple, at ¯rst-price, sealed-bid auctions the Bayes-Nash equilibrium bidding strategy is
given by (3.4). Thus, in principle, it is possible to estimate the underlying probabil-
ity law of valuations using the empirical distribution of bids from a cross-section of
auctions, and then to use this estimate to estimate the optimal reserve price; Paarsch
(1997) provides an example of this with application to English auctions of British
Columbian timber.
When the bid data are not continuously recorded, Haile and Tamer (2003) point
out, using data from English auctions, that it is impossible to identify the distribution
of latent types; one can only estimate bounds using methods developed by Horowitz
and Manski (1995). The reason why this obtains is that the statistical model is one of
\incomplete inference." Essentially, a number of di®erent valuations yield the same
action, preventing the econometrician from inverting the action to get a bidder's type.
Obviously, this is a problem in our model too. What to do? An alternative,
which one might think a useful beginning, would be to assume that F(v) comes
from a parametric family of distributions known up to an unknown (p £ 1) vector µ.




¼i(µ) = [F(vi;µ) ¡ F(vi¡1;µ)] i = 1;:::;K ¡ 1
with




Now, the logarithm of the likelihood function, ignoring the constant, becomes
K X
i=0
mi log[¼i(µ)] = m0 log[F(k1;µ))] +
K¡1 X
i=1
mi log[F(vi;µ) ¡ F(vi¡1;µ)]+
mK log[1 ¡ F(vK;µ)]
which has (p + K) parameters, (µ;v1;v2;:::;vK), but only K pieces of independent
information, the m. Of course, the vis depend on the µ, via equilibrium purposeful
behaviour.
15Assuming a particular family of F(v) and then estimating the parameters of
this family imposed considerable structure on the DGP. What about non-parametric
analysis? Clearly, ^ p is the non-parametric maximum-likelihood estimator of ¼, but
^ p does not contain enough information to estimate F(v). As in Haile and Tamer
(2003), one can only bound it.
7. Experimental Evidence
In order to demonstrate the utility of the approach proposed above, we have con-
ducted a series of experiments. These experiments were conducted in the Laboratoires
universitaires Bell, Laboratoire en commerce ¶ electronique et ¶ economie exp¶ erimentale
located at CIRANO (Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisa-
tions) in Montr¶ eal using undergraduate students from a pool of subjects drawns from
¯ve universities in Montr¶ eal, Qu¶ ebec, Canada, including Concordia University, HEC
(¶ Ecole des Hautes ¶ Etudes Commerciales) Montr¶ eal, McGill University, Universit¶ e de
Montr¶ eal, and UQAM (Universit¶ e du Qu¶ ebec µ a Montr¶ eal).
7.1. Experimental Design
The auctions were conducted electronically using either three or ¯ve potential bidders;
i.e., n of three or n of ¯ve. In all experiments, the valuation distribution had support
on [0;100]. No reserve price existed; all potential bidders were expected to tender
some bid. A potential bidder who submitted a bid of 0 still had a chance, albeit a
small one, of winning and earning some pro¯t. The bid increment was 10, so k1 was
0, k2 was 10, k3 20, and so forth, making K = f0;10;20;30;:::;90g, with kK+1 being
100.
The subjects were ¯rst introduced to the experiment. The subjects were then also
o®ered a bonus which was either a sure $5 or a lottery of ($0;$11) with probabilities
(0:5;0:5).7 The subjects were initially allowed ¯ve practice rounds during which their
valuations were drawn from a uniform distribution on [0;100]. We discarded these
data. Subsequently, we conducted a series of experiments in which the shape of the
distribution varied. The distributions of valuations have the following formulae for
the probability density functions:
f(v) =
8
> > > > > > > > > <




2;500 v 2 [0;50]
Case b)
(100¡v)
2;500 v 2 [50;100]
v
5;000 Case c).
7 We used this information to get a notion of whether subjects were risk averse or not.
16In tables 1{6, we present the theoretical benchmarks for the three types of distribu-
tions with three and ¯ve players.
Three sessions of the experiment were held over two days, 1 and 2 May 2003.
In total, 44 subjects participated: 16 in the ¯rst two sessions and 12 in the last
sesssion. In each of the three sesssions, the subjects were divided into two groups.
Subjects were then matched within their own group, having two or four opponents.
We recorded data concerning 254 auctions when n was three and 150 when n was
¯ve, a total of 1,512 observcations.
7.2. Sample Summary Statistics
In tables 7 and 8, we present the summary statistics for the ^ ps from our experiments,
for ns of three and ¯ve, separately. The columns of the two tables have the realizations
from the experiments as well as the theoretical ¼0
i s. Listed below each column of
realized bid proportions was the total number of observations.
The ¯rst thing to note is that the support of the observed bids contains that of
the theoretical DGP. To wit, some of the participants bid more than our theoretical
model, assuming risk neutrality, would predict. Of course, in many cases, it is only
about ¯ve percent of the data, but in some (e.g., when n is three) it can be as high
as twenty-¯ve percent of the observations.
It is also interesting to note that, were one to ignore information concerning
the valuation distribution generating the experimental data, one could not reject
that these data were BNC. Thus, implementing the test for BNC behaviour using
equation (4.1) would not result in a rejection of the theory. In the language and
notation of Guerre et al. (2000), the estimated »(v) function would be monotonic. In
tables 9 and 10, we tabulated the theoretical and estimated ¡is and vis for the three
di®erent distributions a), b), and c) when n is both three and ¯ve, separately. By
and large, the experimental data do quite well up to bids of ¯fty or sixty, but fail to
predict well in the tails. For small bids, the vis are estimated quite precisely, but at
the endpoints these estimates are quite imprecise.
In tables 11 and 12, we tabulated the ^ ps for bidders who chose the safe bet
over the risky bet when n was three and ¯ve. We call those bidders who chose the
safe bet \risk averse" bidders or \Averse" in the tables and those bidders who chose
the risky bet \risk neutral" bidders or \Neutral" in the tables. Notice that bidding
behaviour is di®erent between these two subgroups. Now, within this experimental
framework, two explanations for these behavioural di®erences exist: ¯rst, di®erences
in preferences across decision makers and, second, non-rational behavioural. We then
sought to modify our theoretical framework to accommodate these two, potentially-
di®erent explanations.
178. Asymmetries
In this section, we extend our theoretical model to accommodate asymmetric bidders.
We assume that bidders have di®erent types of cumulative distribution functions, in-
dexed by g. A bidder of type g gets an independent draw from cumulative distribution
function Fg(¢), while a bidder of type h gets his independent draw from Fh(¢). Of
course, a bidder of type g could have the same cumulative distribution function as that
for type h, but di®erent preferences. Di®erent preference functions would manifest
themselves in the data as apparent di®erences in valuation distributions.
We assume that a bidder's type g is observable by the econometrician, at least
ex post. We seek to infer from the data how the observable type g a®ects bidding
behaviour. Under the assumption of risk neutrality, two di®erent assumptions can
be made about g: ¯rst, type g is private information to the bidders and, second,
type g is common knowledge. In the ¯rst case, although bidders di®er, they are
perceived to be ex ante symmetric. Obviously, this case is easy to analyse. We do
so in subsection 8.1. The second case, when bidders expect others to bid di®erently
from them, is di±cult to analyse in general, particularly with continuous variation in
bids, but tractable under discrete bidding. We do this in subsection 8.2. In section
9, we consider the case of risk aversion among bidders.
8.1. Unknown Types with Symmetric Distributions
We assume here that bidders are of di®erent types g, but that these types are private
information. Denote by !g the probability of being type g where g = 1;:::;G di®erent
types. Suppose that the probability of being a particular type is the same across
bidders. Denote by ¼
g
i the probability that a bidder of type g submits a bid ki.







Using this, one can construct, as before, the vector ¡. Note that the ex ante symmetry
implies that the ¡is are independent of types. The remainder of the analysis discussed
above carries through, particularly that pertaining to Theorem 1.
8.2. Bidders with Known Types
When bidders' types are known, the problem become di±cult. The main di±culty
obtains when calculating the ¡is, which will now vary across types. In the continuous-
variation world, this computational di±culty manifests itself in the form a system of
ordinary di®erential equations instead of just one, (3.3), which need to be solved
simultaneously.
18To begin, let ¼
g
i denote the probability that a bidder of type g submits a bid of ki.
We assume that all of the ¼
g
i s are common knowledge and that, potentially, they di®er
from one another. Under these assumptions, one can calculate, the probabilities of
winning given bid ki. Of course, these will vary from one bidder to the next depending
on a bidder's type g. We denote by ¡
g
i the probability that bidder of type g wins
having submitted bid ki. Introducing N as the set of all n bidders and T as a coalition























Numerically, this involves calculating the sum over all 2jNj¡1 possible coalitions T
which are a subset of N, having removed all of those who are of type g. Once the ¡gs
have been calculated, one must proceed individually through each type g to verify
whether the analog to (3:1) is valid.
9. Risk-Averse Bidders
We can expand our model further by introducing the possibility of risk-averse bidders.
Suppose that a bidder of type g faces the probability of winning ¡
g
i when he submits
ki and has von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functoin Ug(¢). More precisely, suppose






Given some utility function Ug(¢) as well as ¡g, one can calculate the thresholds
v
g
i and ¹ v
g
i in a similar fashion. If ¼
g










i = [Fg(¹ v
g
i ) ¡ Fg(v
g
i)]:
Note that, when the utility function is given, as before, one can identify the
cumulative distribution function of valuations as some points. Similarly, when the
cumulative distribution functions Fg(¢)s are known, one can, from the ¼
g
i s, calculate
the threshold values v
g
i and ¹ v
g
i for all gs and is. In turn, this allows one to identify
some restrictions on the Ug(¢)s. Note, however, that one cannot identify both the
Ug(¢)s and the Fg(¢)s. In future research, we intend to apply the above results to our
experimental data.
1910. Summary and Conclusions
Within the independent private-values paradigm, we have derived the equilibrium
implications of purposeful bidding behaviour at single-unit, ¯rst-price, sealed-bid
auctions when discrete increments are imposed on bidding. Subsequently, we have
developed an empirical framework within which to examine why observed data from
auctions, either experimental or ¯eld, deviates from theoretical predictions. While
according with many real-world auctions, the presence of discrete bid increments also
simpli¯es computation when estimating and testing auction models. Our approach
¯ts within a model of incomplete inference and allows us to test sequentially for
symmetric, equilibrium purposeful behaviour as well as asymmetric, equilibrium pur-
poseful behaviour. We have demonstrated the utility of the approach by applying it
to data from laboratory experiments.
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22Table 1
Case a) with n = 3
i ki vi F(vi) ¡i v¤
i ¼0
i
1 0 11 0.2079 0.0144 11.5307 0.2079
2 10 25 0.4375 0.1085 25.6525 0.2296
3 20 41 0.6519 0.3005 41.8980 0.2144
4 30 59 0.8319 0.5531 59.1918 0.1800
5 40 100 1.0000 0.8413 103.0196 0.1681
6 50 100 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000
Table 2
Case a) with n = 5
i ki vi F(vi) ¡i v¤
i ¼0
i
1 0 10 0.1900 0.0003 10.3453 0.1900
2 10 21 0.3759 0.0078 21.7354 0.1859
3 20 34 0.5644 0.0528 34.1202 0.1885
4 30 48 0.7296 0.1810 48.2745 0.1652
5 40 62 0.8556 0.3996 62.1231 0.1260
6 50 89 0.9879 0.7293 89.5511 0.1323
7 60 100 1.0000 0.9761 478.2535 0.0121
8 70 100 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000
23Table 3
Case b) with n = 3
i ki vi F(vi) ¡i v¤
i ¼0
i
1 0 10 0.0200 0.0001 10.4191 0.0200
2 10 21 0.0882 0.0033 21.5420 0.0682
3 20 33 0.2178 0.0248 33.3042 0.1296
4 30 45 0.4050 0.0999 45.4951 0.1872
5 40 58 0.6472 0.2817 58.3196 0.2422
6 50 80 0.9200 0.6202 80.5441 0.2728
7 60 100 1.0000 0.9221 188.4247 0.0800
8 70 100 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000
Table 4
Case b) with n = 5
i ki vi F(vi) ¡i v¤
i ¼0
i
1 0 10 0.0200 0.0000 10.0294 0.0200
2 10 20 0.0800 0.0000 20.3027 0.0600
3 20 30 0.1800 0.0004 30.7560 0.1000
4 30 41 0.3362 0.0053 41.4846 0.1562
5 40 52 0.5392 0.0407 52.8157 0.2030
6 50 65 0.7550 0.1851 65.2114 0.2158
7 60 84 0.9488 0.5403 84.9110 0.1938
8 70 100 1.0000 0.9027 172.7855 0.0512
9 80 100 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000
24Table 5
Case c) with n = 3
i ki vi F(vi) ¡i v¤
i ¼0
i
1 0 10 0.0100 0.0000 10.4191 0.0100
2 10 21 0.0441 0.0008 21.5420 0.0341
3 20 33 0.1089 0.0062 33.3042 0.0648
4 30 45 0.2025 0.0250 45.8558 0.0936
5 40 56 0.3136 0.0676 56.5928 0.1111
6 50 71 0.5041 0.1702 71.4043 0.1905
7 60 79 0.6241 0.3194 79.0795 0.1200
8 70 100 1.0000 0.6712 100.4137 0.3759
9 80 100 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000
Table 6
Case c) with n = 5
i ki vi F(vi) ¡i v¤
i ¼0
i
1 0 10 0.0100 0.0000 10.0294 0.0100
2 10 20 0.0400 0.0000 20.3027 0.0300
3 20 30 0.0900 0.0000 30.7600 0.0500
4 30 41 0.1681 0.0003 41.4702 0.0781
5 40 52 0.2704 0.0026 52.3909 0.1023
6 50 63 0.3969 0.0133 63.1022 0.1265
7 60 75 0.5625 0.0561 75.1189 0.1656
8 70 84 0.7056 0.1657 84.1982 0.1431
9 80 100 1.0000 0.5605 102.7546 0.2944
10 90 100 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000
25Table 7
Summary Statistics for n = 3










1 0 0.2208 0.2079 0.0296 0.0200 0.0238 0.0100
2 10 0.2250 0.2296 0.0926 0.0682 0.0437 0.0341
3 20 0.1375 0.2144 0.1519 0.1296 0.0556 0.0648
4 30 0.1583 0.1800 0.1370 0.1872 0.0595 0.0936
5 40 0.1208 0.1681 0.2148 0.2422 0.0754 0.1111
6 50 0.0958 0.0000 0.1852 0.2728 0.1508 0.1905
7 60 0.0333 0.1111 0.0800 0.1349 0.1200
8 70 0.0083 0.0519 0.0000 0.1944 0.3759
9 80 0.0148 0.1944 0.0000
10 90 0.0111 0.0675
nT 240 270 252
Table 8
Summary Statistics for n = 5










1 0 0.2200 0.1900 0.0360 0.0200 0.0480 0.0100
2 10 0.1880 0.1859 0.0480 0.0600 0.0440 0.0300
3 20 0.1640 0.1885 0.1400 0.1000 0.0600 0.0500
4 30 0.1200 0.1652 0.1200 0.1562 0.0840 0.0781
5 40 0.1280 0.1260 0.1680 0.2030 0.0520 0.1023
6 50 0.1040 0.1323 0.2040 0.2158 0.0920 0.1265
7 60 0.0440 0.0121 0.1200 0.1938 0.1560 0.1656
8 70 0.0240 0.0000 0.1280 0.0512 0.1760 0.1431
9 80 0.0040 0.0320 0.0000 0.2240 0.2944
10 90 0.0040 0.0040 0.0640 0.0000
nT 250 250 250
26Table 9




















1 0 0.014 0.016 11.531 11.641 0.000 0.000 10.419 10.472 0.000 0.000 10.419 10.919
2 10 0.109 0.115 25.653 27.635 0.003 0.007 21.542 21.866 0.001 0.002 21.542 23.161
3 20 0.301 0.266 41.898 45.273 0.025 0.041 33.304 35.297 0.006 0.009 33.304 36.486
4 30 0.553 0.441 59.192 61.687 0.100 0.119 45.495 47.736 0.025 0.024 45.856 49.315
5 40 0.841 0.644 103.020 84.822 0.282 0.273 58.320 61.066 0.068 0.049 56.593 57.673
6 50 1.000 0.829 128.515 0.620 0.519 80.544 82.278 0.170 0.113 71.404 69.823
7 60 0.950 302.307 0.922 0.752 188.425 121.129 0.319 0.229 79.080 82.319
8 70 0.991 1.000 0.899 220.179 0.671 0.415 100.414 94.436
9 80 0.963 466.599 1.000 0.702 120.081
10 90 0.989 0.935
Table 10




















1 0 0.000 0.001 10.345 10.426 0.000 0.000 10.029 10.026 0.000 0.000 10.029 10.102
2 10 0.008 0.012 21.735 22.323 0.000 0.001 20.303 20.303 0.000 0.000 20.303 20.707
3 20 0.053 0.061 34.120 35.997 0.000 0.002 30.757 31.554 0.000 0.000 30.760 31.952
4 30 0.181 0.162 48.275 49.615 0.005 0.015 41.485 42.339 0.000 0.001 41.470 43.076
5 40 0.400 0.331 62.123 63.203 0.041 0.079 52.816 53.988 0.003 0.003 52.391 52.249
6 50 0.729 0.582 89.551 86.535 0.185 0.275 65.211 69.386 0.013 0.014 63.102 63.424
7 60 0.976 0.802 478.254 136.312 0.540 0.568 84.911 93.636 0.056 0.054 75.119 74.358
8 70 1.000 0.923 252.205 0.903 0.809 172.786 148.163 0.166 0.177 84.198 85.461
9 80 0.976 707.515 1.000 0.928 275.957 0.562 0.501 102.755 103.387
10 90 0.992 0.978 1.000 0.876
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^ p: Risk-Neutral and Risk-Averse Bidders, n = 3
Cases a), b), and c)
Type/ki 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Neutral 0.2372 0.2372 0.1090 0.1731 0.1346 0.0897 0.0192 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Averse 0.1905 0.2024 0.1905 0.1310 0.0952 0.1071 0.0595 0.0238 0.0000 0.0000
Neutral 0.0333 0.1000 0.1556 0.1444 0.2000 0.1611 0.1056 0.0667 0.0222 0.0111
Averse 0.0222 0.0778 0.1444 0.1222 0.2444 0.2333 0.1222 0.0222 0.0000 0.0111
Neutral 0.0120 0.0542 0.0663 0.0723 0.0783 0.1566 0.1325 0.1747 0.1867 0.0663
Averse 0.0465 0.0233 0.0349 0.0349 0.0698 0.1395 0.1395 0.2326 0.2093 0.0698
Table 12
^ p: Risk-Neutral and Risk-Averse Bidders, n = 5
Cases a), b), and c)
Type/ki 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Neutral 0.2171 0.1860 0.1550 0.1163 0.1085 0.1085 0.0543 0.0388 0.0078 0.0078
Averse 0.2231 0.1901 0.1736 0.1240 0.1488 0.0992 0.0331 0.0083 0.0000 0.0000
Neutral 0.0400 0.0514 0.1143 0.1143 0.2000 0.1714 0.1429 0.1257 0.0343 0.0057
Averse 0.0267 0.0400 0.2000 0.1333 0.0933 0.2800 0.0667 0.1333 0.0267 0.0000
Neutral 0.0682 0.0606 0.0682 0.0606 0.0455 0.0682 0.1667 0.1439 0.2348 0.0833
Averse 0.0254 0.0254 0.0508 0.1102 0.0593 0.1186 0.1441 0.2119 0.2119 0.0424
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